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Abstract:   
Current debate on the Social Security Administrations long-term finance of benefits includes 
proposals for independent private investment via individual accounts.  The author first 
investigates what implications disability might have for equity savings account balances.  In light 
of results, incentives to exit the workforce ahead of retirement age are considered when a defined 
benefit program for disability insurance continues to be available.  Included simulation uses 
historic wage series, equity market performance, and current OASDI regulations for cohorts 
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Since the late 1970’s, both the Social Security Actuaries and the public at large have been 
increasingly focused on the long-term solvency of Social Security Administration (SSA) trust 
funds.  The financial health of SSA’s trust funds has been considered with various demographic 
and productivity assumptions.  Along with these measures of the funds’ health, researchers have 
employed alternate financing and benefit mechanisms for the SSA’s main retirement trust fund, 
the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund.  Among proposed design changes, one 
theme has suggested moving from a pooled OASI trust fund, to a mandated system of individual 
accounts.   
 
Because the disabled exit the workforce ahead of retirement age and thus face reduced 
opportunities to save these later proposals have important ramifications for SSA’s Disability 
Insurance as well as for other federal and state benefit programs.  This paper will consider the 
SSA’s Disability Insurance (DI) program in the context of individual accounts for retirement 
(IA) using a two part comparative approach: one which begins first by asking what implications 
disability might have for individual account balances and then continues with consideration of 
two alternate designs for preserving and integrating the current defined benefit DI program, with 
a system of individual accounts.  A behavioral model considers both integration structures 
including likely ramifications for worker application incentives.   
 
The two program variants considered have the following unique structures: 
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• The individual forfeits their individual account to the DI trust fund, and receives continued 
benefits to the individual past retirement age, and  
• The trust fund contributes to an individuals account while they are disabled, and the individual 
retires to their IA balance much like any other worker.    
 
1.1 Individual Accounts and Public Pension Investment in Equities 
Both for the sake of financial returns, and for issues of ethical governance, individual accounts 
would allow the public pension system in the US to move retirement assets away from lower 
yield special issue Treasury instruments and toward assets with historically higher mean returns, 
while simultaneously providing beneficiaries with more direct authority over investment choices.  
The individual account framework thus potentially allows for greater individual control of 
investment choices and related risk/return tradeoffs, while bypassing concerns regarding public 
sector investment strategies and their interaction with private sector finance.    
 
With respect to investment returns, advocates of this approach often point to the historic returns 
of the equity market, which have surpassed that of the traditional OASI retirement program over 
most 40-year periods for single beneficiaries without survivors.  Critics have expressed concern 
regarding the risk of arbitrarily poor equity market outcomes for less fortunate retirement 
cohorts.  It should be noted that these concerns are prevalent for private defined contribution 
pension programs as well.  Critics also express concern that workers may systematically 
overestimate their health, or otherwise myopically overestimate their remaining years of labor 
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force attachment in such a way so as to choose high risk, high return strategies late in their 
careers when there is less opportunity to recover from poor shorter-run equity market yields.   
 
More recently and specific to the idea of financing the creation of individual accounts, some 
critics have pointed out that moving from a system where each generation primarily pays the 
current period benefits of the generation before it (“pay-as-you-go”, or “pay-go” financing) to a 
system where each person saves for their own future benefit creates a transition state in which a 
single generation is required to both pay for the benefits of the generation before it, and to 
accumulate assets for their own retirement.  But since an extra burden is implicit as well for any 
tax increase that solves the current funding gap in order to preserve the “pay-go” system it is 
only the difference in burden of either approach which should be considered.  In this regard the 
current integrated DI Insurance program has not been previously considered, but as this paper 
will show any consideration of the two programs in unison is likely to lead to higher estimates of 
cost for transition, and perhaps continuing programmatic costs.  Generically, even granting the 
consideration of the DI component, the main differences between the current system and a 
system of publicly mandated private accounts, are fundamental design parameters- the quality 
and types of included insurance coverage provision and cost.   
 
1.2 Disability Benefits in the Context of Public Pension 
Benefits of the US pension system are not limited to retirement.  One benefit related issue that 
has received relatively little attention in the current debate is the OASI trust funds interrelation 
with the SSA Disability Insurance (DI) program.  This interrelation makes any change in the 
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OASI program more complex than otherwise.  In its 2001 report on Social Security, the 
President’s Commission did not develop a plan for DI, but recommended that the DI program be 
evaluated in a separate analytic process (pg. 149).  Taking up that separate process with 
acknowledgement of both programs allows consideration of cross-program incentives and related 
implications for finance.   
 
The interrelation between both programs should be considered because current disability benefits 
are formulaically more generous than those provided under OASI for covered persons younger 
than the normal retirement age (NRA).  As well, both benefit calculations and the financing of 
DI are defined in relation to the current OASI program.  Further providing mandate to consider 
the DI trust fund is the current financial position of the DI trust fund.  The OASI trust fund is in 
better shape than the DI trust fund and has been for several years. 
 
Two distinct approaches for considering DI in the context of individual accounts are taken here.  
The first approach considers likely asset levels and comparative returns from individual accounts 
at time of disability application and acceptance, in essence simply describing the individual 
account’s ability to meet the needs of disabled workers, using simulation techniques and 
assumptions described in detail below.  A second approach considers the current DI insurance 
program in the context of an individual account (IA) program from the point of view of 
individual incentives for disability eligible workers.   
 
 6
This essay continues next with a literature review in Section 2.  Section 3 simulates individual 
returns from individual accounts for disabled workers who exit the workforce at three separate 
ages at or beyond the current average age of disability application and award.  Section 4 models 
the relative incentives to work or exit and apply for DI, considering a hybrid system with an 
individual account pension program and two variants of the current DI program.  Section 5 
describes results and concluding remarks follow as Section 6.  Included tables and figures depict 
time variation and summary statistics from estimation of returns for cohorts entering the 
workforce between 1890 and 1964. 
 
2.0 Review of Previous Literature 
This literature review will begin with a focus on Disability Insurance in the context of incentives, 
motivation, and applicant characteristics.  The review then continues with a look at the OASI 
retirement benefits in the context of individual accounts 
 
2.1 The Disability and Worker Incentives Literature  
The literature has documented applicants’ motives, and the acceptance pattern of disability 
programs in detail.  Much of the behavioral DI literature relies implicitly or otherwise on the 
existence of a stock of potential applicants who could successfully apply to the program but for 
some reason choose not to.  Disabled workers should not be expected to apply in cases when 
expected benefits fail to outweigh costs of application, when they lack program information, or 
in cases when they are currently employed, and are unwilling or unable to leave their job before 
applying to be accepted as disabled. 
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With regard to application, Black, Daniel and Sanders, 1998, find evidence that DI application 
increased in communities with high unemployment rates, after having experienced permanent 
unemployment shocks.  They attribute the application increases to positive association with DI, 
which acts to legitimize unemployment for successful applicants.  Their work suggests that 
absent the negative employment shock, there is a stock of potential successful applicants who 
beforehand choose not to apply.    
 
Indeed even if applicants are well informed about their health condition and the criteria of 
acceptance, Bound, 1989, found that unaccepted applicants can look quite similar to those 
accepted.  Thus uncertainty is most likely a factor for some potential applicants.  Borsch-Supan, 
1999, suggests that uncertainty is significant enough to warrant inclusion in models attempting to 
predict workforce exit ahead of normal retirement age.  Diamond and Sheshinski, 1993, look at 
uncertainty in the awards process and suggest that it should be explicitly considered in designing 
both the evaluation process, and benefit level modeled relative to a retirement program in order 
to balance the goals of insuring disability without overly incentivizing workforce exit--given the 
difficulty in evaluating an individual’s disability on medical grounds alone.       
 
2.2 Social Security and the Private Investment Literature  
Uncertainty is also a topic of concern in the more recent literature regarding equity investment 
and retirement program finance.  Turning focus toward work on Social Security finance, 
Smetters, 1998, argues that publicly mandated individual pension accounts are not politically 
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feasible, because the uncertainty faced by individuals in such a system is too great.  (In essence 
this article argues against the plausibility of the approach considered here.)  Smetters points out 
that foreign privatizations to date have included guaranteed minimum benefit levels, and indeed 
this is enough to make one question their feasibility because the idea of a valuable individual 
account and the idea of a minimum are somewhat incongruous. This point is worth emphasizing 
here because combining the current DI program in a retirement system based on individual 
accounts amounts to providing a minimum benefit to those with classifiable disabilities.  The 
tension faced by an IA system generates from the tendency for insurance to affect behavior – 
moral hazard. Specifically, minimums that provide meaningful insurance against bad outcomes 
also promote risk taking in individuals’ portfolio choice.  Thus, either account risks must be 
limited so as to be in line with the insurance provided, or minimums must be low enough to 
encourage necessary investor prudence.  It is unclear that broad based market indexes such as the 
S&P 500 used in this work adequately restrict risk exposure in light of moral hazard.  Smetters 
focuses on private funding of current benefits, a pooled investment approach.   
 
Diamond, 1998, considers a defined benefit (DB) program, where benefits are not tied to 
investment performance, and a mixed defined benefit / defined contribution (DC) approach to 
reform, using an individual account component based on the 1997 SSA Advisory Council 
proposal.  This centers on a contribution of 1.6% of payroll and allows two alternate degrees of 
portfolio choice, the more liberal based on current Individual Retirement Account (IRA) rules, 
and the less liberal limiting choices like many current 401k-type plans.  Diamond also advocates 
the defined benefit approach, citing an alternate political risk- that the mixed system will evolve 
entirely to become a defined contribution system with large administrative costs bourn by the 
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individual account holders.  Work here acknowledges Diamond’s concern directly, working with 
returns from a fully independent defined contribution system.  As returns are estimated from a 
single index- the S&P 500, Diamonds concern about administrative cost is not considered- 
explicitly or otherwise.  Work here abstracts entirely from such costs.   
 
Harris, Meyerson and Smith, 2001 also look at equity investment as a way of financing existing 
program benefits over time, in a pooled framework.  They include several uncertain demographic 
and macroeconomic variables in their model including disability incidence and termination. For 
a fund invested entirely in equities they find that there is a significant risk-return tradeoff, 
especially in the first 10 years following such a policy announcement, with the risk declining 
over time such that a system financed entirely by equity investments would stand only a 1% 
chance of failing to do at least as well as the current system over a 75 year time horizon.  
Significant to the comparison here with individual accounts, when the trust fund invests all of it’s 
holdings in equities the authors express concern that the “government would hold assets worth 
substantially more than GDP.” (A concern voiced in the popular press by others as well)1.  The 
authors further note that even if this were politically and economically feasible, it would likely 
have a substantial effect on both the risk-free interest rate and the equity premium.” (pg.17).   
 
The President’s 2001 Commission, co-chaired by Moynihan and Parsons, looked at three 
alternate models for individual accounts.  Each of the plans amount to a mixed defined benefit / 
defined contribution program somewhat along the lines considered by Diamond, however in 
                                                 
1 For example, "If the government owned all the equities, we wouldn't really be much different than the old Soviet 
Union, …  I think they'll want to tinker and the tinkering will be very damaging." Kevin Hassett as quoted in the 
Washington Post Thursday, January 21, 1999; Page A1 
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each case the accounts are voluntary.  In general the Commission’s plans allows a small set of 
discrete worker investment choices which can be made to have lower transaction costs and a 
reduced risk profile when compared with plans in which workers are granted more choice. Some 
specific focus is granted to the Government’s Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) as a model for the 
investment options.  One version allows larger accounts a greater amount of freedom of choice, 
an allowance tied to the decline in the ratio of transaction costs to account balance and 
economies of scale. 
 
The plans considered in all of the papers mentioned above limit an individual’s stake in private 
markets for financing retirement.  By comparison, this paper considers more radical reform of 
the retirement system implementing a mandatory personal account comprising the whole of 
Social Security.  For the IA program considered here there is no included minimum and no 
explicitly designated limit to the amount of risk individuals can agree to in making investment 
decisions.  With regard to Disability, the Commission’s report did keep the Disability Insurance 
program as currently framed intact, it avoided including specifics regarding disability, suggesting 
that redesign of disability benefit rules be taken up at a future date as a separate exercise2.  This 
essay is an attempt to take up that exercise.   
 
To summarize, most authors surveyed have expressed some degree of skepticism regarding a 
retirement system based largely on individual accounts, either for reasons of political feasibility, 
administrative expense, financing risk, or equity.  The President’s Commission has 
acknowledged this through its use of voluntary accounts, which continue to be made up of the 
                                                 
2 The current phase-in of the SSA’s Ticket to Work Program is one such separate reform at present. 
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minority of payroll contributions, thereby limiting risk exposure and, ostensibly improving 
political feasibility.  In addressing administrative expense the Commission proposes limiting 
investment options.  In some cases options are tied to account balances, allowing greater 
flexibility whenever costs are not significantly impacted.  The two most radical of the 
Commission’s proposals increase the benefits of the long term working poor, and poorer 
surviving spouses as a way of addressing equity.  All three of the Commission’s proposals allow 
for inheritance of account balances, which could significantly improve intergenerational 
transfers, wealth accumulation, labor productivity and the return from labor for workers with 
traditionally low rates of savings, their families, and society overall.  
 
None of the authors surveyed has concerned themselves explicitly with interaction between 
considered retirement system designs and a Disability Insurance program.  The Commission, in 
acknowledging the complexity of interaction between these two insurance programs likewise 
declined to attempt to deal with this topic given their timeline and mandate.  This paper concerns 
it’s self explicitly with such interaction. 
 
3.0 Simulated Wealth Accumulation and Individual Equity Accounts: 
Following any one of the above cited approaches would result in a large spectrum of possible 
accumulations over the course of a workers career.  Consequently, the approach here limits 
consideration to a program based in total on an individual equity account.  In lieu of 
consideration of optimal portfolio mix, the analysis limits worker investment to the Standard & 
Poors 500 index with all dividends reinvested.  In absence of disability, all workers are assumed 
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to work for 40 years beginning at age 22, and to retire on their 62nd birthday.  The analysis 
simulates returns for workers who entered the workforce between 1890 and 1964 (and thus 
would have retired between 1929 and 2003).  The goal is to generate worker returns from 
individual equity accounts over this period, and then to compare those returns to the returns from 
curtailed disabled worker careers.  
 
Persons may reallocate portfolios away from stock to smooth returns in latter years of workforce 
attachment by shifting balances towards a mixed portfolio which includes bonds of various sorts.  
However this sort of behavior is likely to be least for those who become disabled and thus have 
their workforce participation cut short unexpectedly several years ahead of planned retirement. 
Thus estimated balances at early disability (age 49) are likely to be better aligned with 
hypothetical realizations, while the equity account balances from full work histories are likely to 
overstate the impact of equity yields on returns. Because modeled accounts are invested solely in 
equities the spectrum of returns is broader and more volatile than more balanced accounts would 
be, however, by modeling the accounts in this way one may see the contribution of equity market 
performance to potential savings yields most clearly, with out having to worry about the impacts 
of unique and particular investment assumptions on results.   
 
Workers are assumed to earn the average annual earnings in manufacturing as reported in the 
Bureau of Census’ Historical Statistics of the United States back to 1890.  In comparison with 
either the SSA’s median wages across all industries, which extend back to 19503, or historic 
                                                 
3 The SSA average wage series was constructed as part of the 1977 Amendments in order to calculate worker 
Primary Insurance Amount based on a formula that compares yearly worker wages to the average series. 
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wages across all industries from the Historical Statistics back to 1900, the manufacturing series 
yields larger earnings (roughly 9.4 percent higher than the all-industry series and 36.9 percent 
higher than the constructed SSA average wage series, on average), and hence larger investments.  
Use of the manufacturing series will tend to overstate lifetime individual account yields when 
compared with either of the other series, but it has the advantage of being the most continuous 
data series. In order to compute SSA benefits it is necessary to extend the SSA average wage 
series.  This is accomplished using both the all-category and manufacturing category wages 
series described just above.  Because the all-category series only extends back as far as 1900, a 
first effort must be made to integrate this series with that for manufacturing employees.  This is 
accomplished utilizing the difference between the two series for years 1900 – 1905.  The average 
ratio of the two series is then used to extend the all-category series back to 1890.  From here the 
composite all-category series is smoothed to the SSA series as follows. A ratio is calculated for 
the historic series and the SSA series for the 10-year period 1951 to 1960.  The maximum and 
minimum years of deviation are discarded and the resulting eight-year series of deviations used 
to derive a conversion ratio4.  The conversion ratio is then applied to the historic series to create 
a synthetic SSA-like historical series.  This series is checked against two other sources, the 
Current Population Series for years 1947 forward, and the historic manufacturing wage category 
back to 1890 to ensure consistency with these reference wage series.   
 
                                                 
4 A larger series is used for conversion in this second step because of the length of sample to be spliced (1890 to 
1950), however there are limits to how long the series used for this purpose should be.  Specific to this exercise, as 
standards of living rose and covered worker categories of employment increased throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
using longer samples to compute the conversion ratio changes the compared populations and tends to inflate the 
historic series.  The choice of eight years attempts to balance the tension between using too few observations, and 
too may later observations, however, the choice is somewhat arbitrary.  
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For prices, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is referenced from Bureau of Labor Statistics data, 
and used to calculate worker’s Social Security Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), in 
line with SSA methods.  Robert Shiller’s Producer Price Index (PPI) data is used to inflate 
worker wages to current (1999) dollars.  This data series extends back to 1871, and thus is easily 
long enough to accommodate simulations here.  Withholding tax rates of 10.6 percent, 
representing current employer and employee contributions are used as the basis for initial 
contributions to individual accounts 
 
3.1 Simulated Disability Returns from Individual Accounts:  
Table 1 gives the reader a threshold comparison of the yields of an equity account and a 
traditional OASDI account.  The IA is said to “Succeed” if its yield is greater than that offered 
by the pubic program.  When the individual’s equity account is compared at time of retirement it 
succeeds in outperforming the public program more than 3/4ths of the time, however when the 
same account is compared at average age of disability, its success rate falls to less than 10 
percent.  (The primary exercise reported on here assumes disabled workers exit the workforce 
eleven years ahead of retirement, after working 29 years5).    
 
Table 2a and 2b allow the reader to consider the distribution of estimated ratios of individual 
accounts at disability, and retirement, so that the reader may better understand the link between 
                                                 
5 SSA actuary estimates from Motsiopoulos and Zayatz, 2001 point to average award ages between 49 and 51 for the 
1990’s and through most of the next decade.  Assuming a retirement age of 65 suggests that workers loose more 
than 11 years of labor force participation, however since a growing majority of beneficiaries actually exit the labor 
force closer to the early retirement age of 62, the loss of 11 years is taken as a conservative estimate, so as not to 
overstate a disabled workers missed participation. 
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early work force exit and IA yields.  In addition, exercises involving workforce exit 5, and 3 
years ahead of retirement are also reported.  These additional values are picked to correspond to 
the early retirement age differential as it exists for workers today (3 years), and as it will in the 
future, for cohorts born later than 1960 (5 years).  Under current law, there is some evidence of 
induced disability application at Early Retirement Age. 
 
One might wish to consider these additional estimates in the context of optimal retirement 
timing.  However even near the end of a “boom” it remains unclear to a all workers (disabled or 
otherwise) whether fund balances are smaller, or larger than they might be eleven, five, or three 
years in the future, a continued boom, or new bull market may or may not emerge over the 
course of a decade.  With rare large downward movements in equity markets, ex-post, there is 
always the question of whether investors properly assessed risk.  In any implemented mandatory 
IA framework, there are likely to be cohorts who retire after market peaks, and who face returns 
below those expected a few years before retirement.  Some of these labor force participants will 
find it relatively easy to stay in the workforce long enough to recover from sudden market 
declines while others may not.  In any case, regardless of the perspective given to these 
comparisons, one should not easily be persuaded that workers are able to optimally time the 
market in the context of workforce exit.   
 
Disability can significantly impact savings in an individual’s account because it curtails labor 
force participation.  With early exit from the labor force, the worker loses a great deal of his-or-
her lifetime savings opportunity.  Most obviously, the worker loses accumulation of the 
withholding that would have occurred in the next eleven years.  As well however, the worker 
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loses compounding on not only those years savings, but on savings in early work years.  
Compounding on withholding from early years is substantial and thus, on average, so is the 
opportunity cost of early exit in this regard.  Table 2b reports summary statistics on compound 
rates for each cohorts withholding in their first year.  This table reports several summary 
statistics, which help to give a picture of the range in returns for equities, and thus outcomes over 
a 40-year career as well as for the disability-curtailed careers.   
  
Figure 1 provides a visual comparison of the relative returns from equity accounts at retirement 
and disability across workforce cohorts.  A closer look at estimated account balances at time of 
disability in current (1999) dollars is included as Figure 2.  It has been suggested that workers 
might annuitize these lump-sum balances, and several proposals for individual accounts do 
expressly deal with annuitization.  This is not pursued here because it is unclear that a market for 
annuity of disability benefits would exist, even when a robust retirement annuity market might.  
Disability affects mortality in widely varying ways.  Some disabled persons can be expected to 
live long after onset, and others only very short periods.  For those with very short time horizons 
annuitization would most probably not be attractive, whereas for those with very long life 
expectancies, annuitization of the smaller account balances associated with early exit might 
likewise be unattractive to either party.  Given that the observed preference for annuity would 
seem to vary predictably with account balance and longevity, it is unclear what terms would be 
offered to those disabled persons who seek annuitization, and whether terms would vary 
substantially by cohort.  Without a clear idea on pricing, it seems inappropriate to carry forward 
this exercise at present. 
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3.2 SSI and Likely Interaction with Federal and State Budgets:  
The disabled in these exercises have account balances that vary greatly, both because of wage 
growth over time and because of volatility in market returns.  As a result, many would wind up 
with monthly benefits below the cut off for SSI, a welfare program administered by the SSA, and 
various state governments, which is financed by Treasury’s general fund as an on-going expense.  
At present, absent state subsidies, the Federal SSI program tops up individual payments to $750 
per month.  Summing this figure over 20 years yields an amount of $180,000.  Absent SSA’s 
Disability Insurance program the account balances described by Figure 3 suggest that many 
disability cohorts could easily place burdens of over half this sum, per capita on the general fund 
over 20 years through the SSI program.  It is estimated that half of the disabled population 
survives at least this long, and that 40 percent survive 30 or more years6, thus the fiscal burden 
implied for the federal government is significant.  As well, some states increase federal SSI 
benefits for their residents; for these states, there is an additional fiscal burden implicit in any 
Federal disability program that relies primarily on the workers individual account7.  
 
4.0 The Current Disability Program and Individual Accounts: 
At the opposite extreme of a disability insurance benefit based principally on individual account 
savings, is a benefit tied to the current SSA DI program.  One way to think of this option is to 
allow the current DI trust fund to pay benefits up to retirement age, after which the worker would 
                                                 
6 Hennessey and Dykacz, 1992, using two separate disability cohorts (1972 and 1985), estimate that about ½ of 
disabled persons will survive to 20 years of entitlement.  Slightly more than 40 percent are expected to survive 
through at least 30 years of entitlement.   
7 California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington 
State and the District of Columbia all have Federally administered state supplements, additional states have locally 
administered programs that supplement SSI either directly or indirectly. 
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retire with his-or-her account balance.  This most nearly replicates the lifetime expense of 
individuals’ DI benefits; which provides benefits from the DI fund for years up to normal 
retirement age with no obligation past this point.  Assuming no behavioral changes within in the 
pool of potential applicants, this scheme could be expected to leave the date of fund exhaustion 
as it is currently, after which general funds would be required to keep the program solvent.   
 
However, from the worker’s perspective this program hybrid is quite different than current law.  
Disabled workers in this type of system would potentially be likely to observe a change in their 
benefit level upon reaching retirement age, as the basis for benefit shifted from the DI trust fund 
to an individual’s account.  Assuming the account was not drawn against during disability it 
would continue to accrue gains in valuation and dividend realizations until retirement.  Account 
growth would be stunted however as additions to the account thought the withholding tax would 
cease at the time workers exit the labor force.  For this reason, changes in the level of benefits at 
Normal Retirement Age would likely amount to negative income shocks.  This too potentially 
has implications for SSI.  While the SSI DI burden would not be affected, SSI retirement 
expenditures might increase in a disability structure such as this. 
 
4.1 Disability and Account Forfeiture- Program Substitution  
Avoiding this discrete income shock, analysis in this subsection assumes that the individual 
would forfeit their account balance to the DI trust fund which would then pay them a benefit for 
the remainder of their life calculated using the current (2000) law.   
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Assuming that the SSA did not change account makeup, they would on average accumulate 11 
years of accrual with which to finance the inflation indexed annuity offered by current OASI 
benefit, alternatively they could sell the fund and invest in risk free US Treasury bonds8.  In this 
case, even assuming that applicant behavior was not affected, it is still not obvious how DI trust 
fund solvency would be impacted- a lot would depend on market returns.    Rational individuals 
would be most likely to forfeit their accounts when the expected present value of the stream of 
DI benefits to be greater than the current value of their account.  By this logic, one might expect 
any such DI trust fund to be systematically under funded in providing retirement benefits. 
 
The distinguishing feature of this integration of the two programs is the DI trust fund’s receipt of 
the worker’s individual account, in exchange for continued disabled worker benefits past 
retirement age.  Because the opportunity to make such a trade might affect disabled worker 
behavior, a model incorporating this approach is developed below.    
 
Starting from the current law, anyone considering exiting the labor force ahead of normal 
retirement age should see the DI program as at least superficially alluring.  Individuals who 
choose OASI early retirement benefits receive a reduced percentage of the benefit they would 
receive from Disability Insurance, under which they receive their full benefit- as calculated using 
their workforce history.  The current difference between the two types of payment increases by 
5/9ths percent each month that an individual chooses to retire ahead of the NRA. By comparison 
                                                 
8 Either scheme would not necessarily affect government’s relation with private industry in a way that warrants the 
same degree of concern given to other scenarios in which the government manages a trust fund comprised in portion 
of private equities.  This is especially true if the fund is handled in such a way that the government is unable to know 
it’s composition, i.e., in cases where individuals are allowed significant portfolio choice, however this likely would 
complicate applicant behavior concerns. 
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with the individual account, the value of what is forfeited is less well known.  This is especially 
true for younger workers who face uncertainty in both the trajectory of market returns, and the 
potential trajectory of their own careers.  As workers approach the age at which the plan anyway 
to retire however, the traditional DI benefit is more easily compared to their portfolio balances 
and labor market outcomes are better known.   
 
Besides the difference in monthly income, there is another difference between continuing labor 
force attachment and the DI program, the availability of Medicare.  Current DI recipients are 
eligible for Medicare two years after successfully applying to DI (Medicare eligibility generally 
occurs at age 659).  Thus successful application to DI occurring anytime up to two years before 
age 65 therefore includes the added benefit of extended Medicare coverage.  
 
In the model below, workers consider exiting the labor force and compare the expected value of 
application to the DI program with the expected value of continuing labor force attachment, 
including the expected value of continued retirement account accumulations.  After considering 
the expected value of each option the work rationally makes application to DI whenever it yields 
the highest expected return.  In a discrete framework this is akin to simultaneously comparing 
options for exit to the option of continued work force attachment in each period.  If the 
individual options for exit compare unfavorably with work in the model, then the individual fails 
to exit the labor force in the current period. 
 
                                                 
9  The Medicare eligibility age is not set to increase with the NRA at present. 
 21
Differences in across individuals lead to heterogeneous outcomes.  In this model there are a few 
main points of variation across individuals in this model.  In evaluating DI, the most significant 
are the persons expected probability of acceptance, the time remaining to the Medicare-eligible 
age and, the individual’s estimate of life expectancy10.  Let: 
 
ϕ  = Pr (eligible | health) 
θ  = remaining life expectancy | age & health, or age & self assessment 
℘ = discount rate 
ξ  = expected cost of obtaining medical evidence  
µ  = expected value of 1 months Medicare coverage. 
α  = (NRA – current age in months) 
age  = age of individual considering exiting the labor force = NRA - α 
PV  = present value as a function of θ, ℘. 
PIA = the SSA primary insurance amount at Normal retirement age. 
 
With these components in place we can begin to give a formal structure to the relative benefits 
and cost of application.  Given an average waiting period of 5 months, the expected value of an 
application to DI in the current period can be expressed as: 
 
1. E(DI) = ϕ PV[(PIA(θ-5) + (max {0, (α-24)-age}µ)] - ξ 
                                                 
10 Life expectancy is a function of disability as well as other potentially unrelated things such as consumption of 
cigarettes, alcohol, and other inputs that vary within categories and intensities of disability as experienced.  The 
individual may have unique information on these additional factors. 
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Where ((α-24)-age)µ adds the value of Medicare benefits.   This exposition is written generally, 
for the specific case of disability eleven year ahead of normal retirement, the value is readily 
derived as 132µ 
  
Allowing individuals a choice to remain in the labor force requires that we model the expected 
value of work.  The expected value of work to an individual is the pay received from work, 
minus the disutility of working, plus the expected increase in the individuals retirement account 
balance from further workforce participation.  Assuming wages constant, the marginal change in 
the PIA for any extra month of work is the value of that months withholding, and the probable 
compound.  Let: 
w = monthly wage and benefits 
τ = the withholding rate assigned to employers – assumed to be ½ total withholding. 
λ = disutility of working one additional month  
π = market valuation of retirement account at end of period. 
 
Then the expected value of working an additional month is: 
2. E(Wt)  = w (1+τ) - λ + δ(E (πt+1)/δ(age) + δ(E (DI))/δ(age) 
Where: 
3. π = 2 τw + δπt-1/δt  and, 
4. δ(E(DI))/δ(age) = ϕPV(-µ)  for individuals with extended Medicare, else = 0. 
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5.  δ(Wt)/δ(age) is a function of average real wage growth for the cohort- tied to 
productivity, labor’s share of profits, and the experience weighted age profile for relevant worker 
type. 
 
Of note are the different signs for the changes in work and DI award with respect to age.  
Working an additional month has positive effects on retirement savings in most periods, its 
expected contribution declining in line with remaining compound periods, and the individual’s 
degree of pessimism regarding likely financial market performance.  However, working an 
additional month has a strictly non-positive effect on expected DI award.  The effect is negative 
each month before the last 24 of work and zero thereafter, as a function of µ. 
 
Given these options, an agent can compare E (W) and E (DI) and make a forward-looking choice 
in the current period about working, or applying to Disability Insurance.  The worker should be 
indifferent if the valuations of each option are equal.  There is a third option too, which is to exit 
the labor force and to let the account balance in the retirement account continue to accrue.  
Current consumption must then be financed out of savings.  This is akin to letting w=0 and λ=011 
in the formulation above. 
Considering this third option is relevant for the predicament in which a worker is unexpectedly 
let go and does not expect to find work easily.  The sudden change in E(Wt) that accompanies 
such action changes the valuation of labor force participation as follows- 
                                                 
11 Actually if the disutility of work is derived form being in the workforce then some or all of the value of λ should 
remain- this is akin to what Black, etal. found for coal towns with high layoffs- that there was a disutility attached to 
remaining in the labor force and being without work in the current period.  However simplifying to allow λ=0 
should make staying in the labor force more attractive than otherwise, and thus errs on the side of making DI 
application less attractive.  
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6.  E(Wt | w=0, λ=0) = δ(E (πt+1)/δ(age) + δ(E (DI))/ δ(age) 
Thus only when savings are sufficient to allow current consumption, and  
7. δ(E (πt+1)/δ(age) > δ(E(DI))/ δ(age)  
is remaining in the workforce both attractive and feasible.   
Two very interesting and important results follow directly.  First, without sufficient savings 
continued labor force participation may actually be attractive, without being feasible. Second, 
even with sufficient savings, a worker may wish to convert their retirement account balance into 
a DI balance whenever the inequality is reversed.  Thus much depends on a workers contingent 
savings, and on expectations for E(πt+1), where πt+1 is now only a function of market 
performance.   
 
In economic downturns there is often a simultaneous increase in unemployment and a decline in 
equity market performance, thus using the model above one should expect increased application 
in downturns.  This is not unique to the equity financed individual account retirement savings 
structure analyzed here12; what is unique, however, is the degree of uncertainty in the valuation 
of continued work and retirement benefits, which now more closely ties the workers decision to 
remain in the workforce with equity market performance through the defined contribution 
retirement program, and the workers expectation E(πt+1).  The concern is that some individuals 
who might otherwise remain in the workforce holding retirement benefits nearly constant in a 
                                                 
12 Included Figures 4a, and 4b show historic trends in application and award with respect to recessions.   
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recession, now exit and apply for DI in order to trade their uncertain account balance for a more 
certain stream of payments in later years.    
 
In order to avoid the perverse incentive described above, which may encourage current DI 
program uptake in the context of individual accounts whenever market returns decline 
precipitously, one might wish to reintegrate persons and their accounts at Normal retirement age, 
perhaps with accommodation for loss of contributing years.  The next section considers this 
alternate approach. 
 
4.2 Disability and Integrated Individual Accounts –Serial Participation 
This approach to integrating DI in a system of individual accounts for retirement would preserve 
the individual’s account and have the DI trust fund continue to make contributions toward 
disabled individual’s retirement.  As such the DI trust fund would experience an additional 
burden through the requirement that it finance both current benefits and contributions to the 
individual account on behalf of the disabled worker.  The DI trust fund would fail to acquire the 
assets of the workers account and would no longer be burdened with benefit payments past 
retirement age.  There may still be discrete jumps in benefits when the funding basis changed at 
retirement age, however it would no longer be the case that the disabled faced a greater 
probability of being poor in retirement due to the loss of withholding contributions in periods of 
disability.  The disabled would retire to the market situation faced by their birth-cohort13. 
 
                                                 
13 This statement assumes that those participating in the labor force do not forestall exit when private market returns 
are relatively low.   
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Behaviorally, the agents described above could be expected to evaluate this sort of program 
differently.  Remaining in the workforce while out of work, i.e. when w=0 and λ=0, now 
imposes greater opportunity cost, because E(πt+1) is now always greater within the disability 
program, than outside of it, by the amount of withholding contribution put aside on behalf of the 
worker, 2τ, this clearly motivates application and workforce exit14.   
 
Replacing the guaranteed stream of payments past retirement age with individual access to their 
account can either increase or decrease application motive, and so is less clear-cut.  In cases 
where the agent expects the present value of current SSA retirement benefits to be less than that 
of the account, the agent now has comparatively more incentive to apply.  Alternatively, in cases 
where the expected present value of the account, including contributions, is less than the SSA 
benefit the incentive to apply is comparatively reduced, though observed behavior may be less 
affected in this group.  This is because in cases where the worker has significant account 
balances and high wages, the ability to keep their account, and the contribution stream might 
actually remove a barrier to application to DI, while for workers with small accounts and low 
contributions, the lack of ability to trade their account for a higher valued annuity will reduce 
incentive.  Since small-account workers among the most likely to have lower contingency 
savings and thus few alternatives to applying, behavior may be more similar for this group under 
either structure.  For the less affluent individual application behavior may be dictated by savings.  
This design however does avoid the perverse incentive found in section 3.4.1, for individuals that 
would successfully apply to DI simply to avoid uncertain market outcomes, the new program is 
                                                 
14  If workers kept their portfolios unchanged, such continued withholding could add significant support to markets 
during downturns.  Since however it is unlikely that workers would keep fund allocations constant, it is unclear how 
large any such stabilizing affect might be.    
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no longer attractive.  There is no ability to trade away from the account, and no contingent 
minimum benefit for retirement of the type referred to by Smetters in the literature review above.       
 
Because proposing that the DI trust fund pay surrogate withholding taxes to individual funds 
entails added expense it is useful to try to anticipate costs.  In order to ascertain that, one must 
first specify how much the fund should contribute, on behalf of the worker.  To give one answer, 
the contributions might be expected to continue at the level that the disabled worker had 
followed before becoming disabled, however, this would likely under-fund young disabled 
workers unless it incorporates an experience path, which inflates contributions in later years. 
 
Such calibration within industry and job classification should be seen as relatively feasible, 
though simple approaches are likely to overstate wage growth if they consider only surviving 
workers.  More general series may thus do a better job as they capture a larger cross-section of 
workers, regardless of career path across industry and job classification.  For this effort, a rough 
estimate of this spirit is calculated as the number disabled times the withholding tax on the 
experience adjusted manufacturing wage series15, for the average period of disability.  For one of 
the more recent retirement cohorts (entering the workforce in 1960, expected retirement in 
1999), an 11-year disability would cost the trust fund roughly $40,300 in withholding tax over an 
equal period.  Inflation adjusted per worker costs in future periods could be expected to rise in 
line with real wage increase, and thus would be tied to productivity.  Figure 4a gives a historic 
trend in the number of awards through 2001.  Taking the average annual number of awards in 
                                                 
15 A better wages series can be derived from observed wages of disabled applicants, or awardees in years prior to 
application, and the experience weighting the contributions based on age of onset.  A current sample of this type 
exists as the SSA earnings history attached to the restricted access HRS data.  
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recent years yields an estimate of 625,800 awards and a total increased trust fund exposure of 
roughly $25.2 billion over the course of a single cohort’s disability.   
 
Applying this estimate across future cohorts, the program variant described above is likely to due 
significant further damage to the DI trust fund.    Additional withholding would thus be required 
to support it.  However, SSI burden should not be affected in this variant of the DI program, 
either in years of disability or later, through retirement, at least not beyond changes in burden 
associated with an individual account reform of OASI.   
 
In terms of worker incentives, this type of program does do a better job of insulating the program 
against equity market shocks, however it may not improve upon employment shock outcomes.  
Of course, as figures 2a and 2b illustrate, the current program shows evidence of response to 
labor market shocks caused by recession, so this type of responsiveness may be more in line with 
current program policy and expectations.   
 
5.0 Summary of Results from Simulation and Behavioral Models: 
The work here has focused on an individual account made up completely of the S&P 500.  Of 
course workers might insure themselves with portfolios that lean toward less volatile assets.  
Also while the focus here is clearly on DI, analysis has been carried out which may be 
considered relevant to a retirement system based on individual accounts.  Because these results 
may also be of interest and because they support disability analysis herein, the results of this 
wealth accumulation simulation are depicted in Figure 1.  This figure should serve to orient the 
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reader with some fundamental impressions before carrying forward the papers main body of 
work.  While individual equity accounts do much better than the US public retirement program, 
they fare far worse when compared to public disability programs.  This is troubling because 
historically public retirement and disability programs have been closely linked.  Table 1 gives a 
summary of discrete binary comparisons of the programs.  Figure 1 and Table 1 together 
suggests that stock market based individual accounts alone would not be likely to afford 
disability benefits comparable to those provided by public defined benefit plan now in place.   
 
In another comparison, Figure 2 gives readers an idea of how large individual accounts are likely 
to be eleven years ahead of retirement, at the average age of disability award.  A bottom panel 
provides the reader a look at the ratio of expected awards at disability, and retirement for each 
cohort.  IN these figures, the volatility in account balances based solely on cohort is striking and 
significant at all withholding levels.  It is worth highlighting the large standard deviations in 
Table 2, which suggest that a great deal of uncertainty remains regarding the adequacy of 
individual account savings for disability.    
 
Figure 3 looks at the benefit provided by a DI system based solely on individual accounts once 
more; this time in comparison with account balances after a full 40 years of workforce 
participation and contribution.  Results are reported for an average worker’s account 11 years out 
from retirement as well as for 5 years out from retirement and 3 years out from retirement.  In all 
three cases the degree of deviation by cohort is again striking. There are quite a few years where 
missing even 3 years of returns significantly reduces individual account yield when compared to 
the counterfactual of remaining in the workforce.  Perhaps not surprisingly the opposite is true as 
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well.  In the context of retirement this volatility may further induce early retirement for all 
covered workers when markets give strong returns, and discourage any exit in the wake of poor 
market performance poorly16.  An increased link between labor and financial markets for elder 
workers is of concern because the ability to delay retirement depends quite a lot on the condition 
of the individual and on the condition of the labor market during these periods.  Financial market 
volatility may be of concern as well if workers are not be able to appreciate historically high 
valuations as they are realized, or are tempted to switch to high risk high return strategies late in 
their careers, when they are least likely to be able to recover from any realized losses. 
 
Since workers do not really know what kind of returns to expect from the market over the course 
of several years; Figure 3 is not intended to suggest that a worker has sufficient information to 
time exit optimally.   It is important to note as well that some of the return ratios across time here 
look rather low not because returns were abnormally low for early exits, but rather because the 
market continued to gain or showed accelerated gains, as was the case in the later 1990’s.  In this 
light, the bottom panel of Table 2 gives results on account ratios and compounding for 1st year 
investments- the investment with longest opportunity to compound.  Thus Table 2 gives a more 
absolute take on time based variation in outcomes and should work to enhance appreciation of 
market outcomes beyond what Figure 4 would alone provide.   
 
Considerations of likely worker response to program changes is concerning.  In hybrid programs 
which fuse a public disability insurance program to system of mandated individual accounts, 
                                                 
16 This is particularly concerning if a wage response follows since, in boom years experienced workers would be 
more scarce, and in recession years more plentiful.    
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incentives to exit early and claim disability insurance are found to be greater than those under the 
current program rules.  Lest one consider that the required condition of “Disability” should limit 
behavioral changes, Figures 4a and 4b apprise the reader of trends in application and award for 
the current Disability Insurance program.  Here one can see in increase in both application and 
award of DI under adverse conditions.  With further appeal to a behavioral approach to 
application, the model developed in Section 4 of this paper suggests that stronger counter-
cyclical application patterns should emerge if the current DI program is left in place while 
mandated individual accounts comprise retirement savings either in response to negative equity 
market shocks, or negative labor market shocks, or both.  One formulation described in Section 
4.2 does a good job of theoretically insulating the program from equity market shocks, but 
increases program expense and thus may actually increase some labor market distortions when 
compared to either the current program, or other hybrid designs described here.  Taken along 
with the results of Table 1, it seems unlikely that individual account balances would afford to 
afford equal or better protection for workers than the current disability program.  Thus there is 
strong reason to believe any integration of a defined contribution retirement system based on 
individual account with a defined benefit system like the current DI system would see an 
increase in counter-cyclical application to the defined benefit disability program.    
 
6.0 Summary Conclusions: 
Analysis here has used as its kernel a rather extreme position regarding Social Security program 
design, in which the OASI program is entirely scrapped and replaced with a mandated system of 
individual accounts invested in a single equity index.  Results thus should be considered in light 
of this assumption. 
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In such a system, DI benefits are considered first in the context of an individual’s account for 
retirement.  There is nothing very special about looking at fund balances ahead of retirement, 
however putting these results in the context of disabled populations, is important because 
disability, by its very nature limits options for continuing work force participation, so for very 
many disabled persons there is no near substitute for application.  The individual account 
structure modeled here in Section 3 is exceptionally extreme, amounting to a program where 
workers self-insure against disability, but since bad outcomes maybe outside of the workers 
control, such acts of nature are usually provided for with pooled insurance designs.  Inclusion of 
a workers SSI disability award shows that in lieu of a pooled insurance approach to disability, 
the general position of federal and state finances would likely be worsened. 
 
Next a continued defined benefit pooled insurance approach to DI in which workers forfeit their 
accounts to receive DI is considered and shown to likely reduce workforce participation when 
either equity markets or labor markets perform poorly.  A third alternative explored here allows 
workers to keep their accounts, and increases the burden on the current DI trust fund though it 
does a better job of insulating DI against poor equity market performance, but may increase 
uptake when poor labor market outcomes occur.  Either defined benefit approach to disability 
benefits in an individual account context substantially reduces the displacement associated with 
SSI and other federal and state specific programs. 
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While the simple exercises here have not focused on cross-section variance in earnings or the 
impact of wage inequality on accounts (except as enters through increases in productivity in the 
included historic wage series), the volatility in returns across time as depicted is strong enough to 
cause some concerns about equity along the lines of those raised by authors who have focused 
more on these topics, some of whom are included in the literature review above.  Further in this 
regard, work here has shown that even for persons who exit the workforce very near to 
retirement, that there can be great swings and reversals of fortune such that early workforce exit 
may be desirable, or may turn out to have been desirable after the fact.  This is significant for 
individual accounts both in the context of retirement and disability.  Several current proposals 
attempt to limit worker investment choices to reduce risk.  The comparisons of outcomes near to 
the end of standard careers suggest that a tapering down of account holder choices in later years 
may be particularly beneficial in reducing the volatility of returns, however such tapering 
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Table 1:  Direct Simple Comparisons of Accounts by Type  
 
 
OASI, DI, and Individual Equity Account Returns Compared by Retirement Cohort
For retirement cohorts 1929 - 2003 (75 age cohorts)
IEA > SSA SSA > IEA Total % Success
IEA (-a-)
Social Security Regulation, Year 2000 Methodology: (-b-)
OASI 56 19 75 75%
DI 4 71 75 5%
44% Replacement Rate Methodology: (-c-)
OASI 61 14 75 81%
DI 6 69 75 8%
Notes:
-a-:  Individual Equity Account represents investment of 10.6% of labor income in S&P 500 with
        reinvestment of all returns.  Final balance is divided across 20 remaining years of life.
-b-: OASI and DI returns are for single claimants with no survivors






Table 1a illustrates the effect different withholding tax assumptions and methodologies can have 
on outcomes.  (See Figure 1.)  Using a constant 44% replacement rate, and the current 
withholding tax assumptions an Individual Account invested in the S&P500 yielded greater 
retirement returns 75 percent of the time.   
 
Table 1b suggests the same pattern would not hold for single disabled beneficiaries, who file and 
claim disability at the current average age of 49, 11 years before the SSA benchmark early 
retirement age.      
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Table 2a and 2b: 
Table 2a:
Individual Account ratios DI(IA):OASI(IA) 
Years Before Retirement 3 5 11
at Time of Exit
Average 83.7% 41.8% 45.0%
Median 76.2% 33.0% 31.1%
Std. Deviation 30.2% 27.8% 30.8%
Maximum 183.4% 131.8% 123.4%
Minimum 44.7% 7.7% 10.7%
Table 2b:
Number of Times Worker's First Year Contributions Compound Before Withdrawl 
Years Before Retirement Age 0 3 5 11
at Time of Exit
Number of Years 40 37 35 29
of Compounding
Average 16.1 12.8 10.8 6.8
Median 13.0 11.4 9.3 5.9
Std. Deviation 8.7 6.1 4.7 3.1
Maximum 44.3 31.8 26.0 15.5
Minimum 5.4 4.6 4.2 2.3  
 
 
Tables 2a and 2b depict summary statistics in two important dimensions for individual account 
holders.   
 
Table 2a gives much the same information as is illustrated in Figure 4, in table format.   
 
Table 2b describes average compounding and associated variability for workers first year 
contributions to individual accounts, for the same three relative early exit dates associated with 
disability, and including the calculation for a full 40-year work history.  Of interest, the 
minimum compounding outcomes are larger for longer work histories.  The range of outcomes is 
large with maximum compounds over six times as large as minimums in each exit case. 
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Individual Equity Account Balance at Retirement
for retirement cohorts 1929 - 2003 (1999 Dollars)
Social Security 
2000 Regulations
Individual Equity Account 
Balance
Social Security 

































































Individual Equity Account Balance - with Disability 11 Years before Retirement
for retirement cohorts 1929 - 2003 (1999 Dollars)
Social Security 
2000 Regulations
Individual Equity Account 
Balance
Social Security 
Replacement Rate of 44%
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Year: Laborforce Entry | Expected Retirement
Individual Equity Account Balance 11 Years Before Retirement







































































































































Year: Laborforce Entry | Expected Retirement
Individual Equity Account Balance Ratio
for retirement cohorts 1929 - 2003
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Year: Laborforce Entry | Expected Retirement
Account Balance Ratio is defined as (Disability:Retirement) Assuming Intended 40-Year LFP
Three Measures of an Individual Equity Account Balance Ratio
for retirement cohorts 1929 - 2003  
loss of 11 years of work
loss of 5 years of work




Figure 4:  DI application & award over the business cycle & across time 
 
 























Both applications and trust fund burden tend to increase during recession, with the recession(s) 
















































Social Security Disability Insurance Applications and Awards






















































Social Security Disability Insurance Awards per 1,000 Insured Workers





 Figure 5: 













22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
Age
Age Earnings Profile of Wage or Salary Income  
Conditional on Working at least 35 hours a Week, and 39 Weeks a Year
Census 2000 Suplementary Survey (1999 data)
Plotted data
 
Data from the Census 2000 Supplementary Survey used to experience weight the earnings of 
workers in each cohort, by age for their period of labor force participation, up to 40 years 
between ages 22 and 61.  The fitted earnings peak for workers included in the estimation occurs 
at age 51.  Fitted Data are used to synthesize the effect of experience on worker wages, applied 
as a percent of wages for the average aged worker in the data, age 41.  By age 61, the experience 
weight has declined to 99 percent of the median age wage.  Age 61 is the first age for which the 
experience factor is lower than 100 percent beyond median age 41. 
 
